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I INTRODUCTION
A major reform of Italian company law took place as the
result of Decree law No 6 of January 17, 2003, which has
had a considerable impact on management structures in
the Italian public companies (societa per azioni). According
to Article 2380 of the Civil Code (as amended by the latter
Decree law) if the statutes of the company do not provide
otherwise the administration and control of a public
company is regulated by paragraphs 2,3 and 4 of section VI
bis of Chapter V of the Code which relate to the
management and control of public companies. The
provisions of these paragraphs, which deal respectively
with directors, the committee of auditors, and the audit of
the accounts (controlle contabile) will be considered below.
However, Article 2380 also provides that the
administration and control of the company may instead be
governed by paragraphs 5 or 6 of section VI bis if the
statutes of the company so stipulate. In such an event,
significant functions given to the committee of auditors
(collegio sindicale) of companies having a traditional
structure are exercised instead when the dual board system
is employed by the supervisory board; when the monistic
system is used instead, certain such functions are
performed by the internal audit committee (comitato per il
controllo sulla gestione). By Article 2380(3), unless otherwise
stipulated the rules concerning directors contained in
paragraph 2 of section VI bis are applicable to the board of
directors when the monistic system is used, and for the
executive board when the dualistic system is used. These
systems are governed by paragraphs 5 and 6 of section VI
bis.
The choice given to Italian public companies by
paragraphs 5 and 6 to make use of the new dualistic or
monistic structures would seem to show the influence of
German and English law, as well as of the European
Company Regulation. When a company has a traditional
structure the rules governing the committee of auditors
differ according to whether or not the company is quoted.
Italian public companies which are listed on the Italian
Stock Exchange have to comply with the guidelines
contained in the Code of Corporate Governance, or
explain why they do not do so. This Code emphasises the
need for an adequate member of independent non-
executive directors on the board of directors. Furthermore
the board is required to set up an Internal Code
Committee and a Remuneration Committee consisting
mainly of independent directors.
II RULES APPLICABLE TO COMPANIES
HAVING A TRADITIONAL STRUCTURE
Management
The directors (amministratori) of a public company which
adopts the above form may number one or more persons
whose term of appointment may not exceed three years
(Civil Code, Arts 2380 bis and 2383(2)). They are not
required to be members of the company. The first directors
are appointed by the deed of incorporation whilst
subsequent directors are, in principle, appointed by the
general meeting (Art 2383 (1), ibid). Persons who are
under an interdict, or who are mentally ill or bankrupt, or
who have been made subject to a penalty which results,
even temporarily, in their interdiction from office are not
eligible to be directors of a public company and, by Article
2382 of the Italian Civil Code, if they are so appointed,
they forfeit office. The shareholders are empowered to
reappoint a retiring director unless the statutes provide
otherwise: they may also remove a director from office by
a resolution of the general meeting, without prejudice to
an action for damages if there is no just reason for such
dismissal (Art 2383(3)).
The directors must appoint one of their number to be
chairman (presidente) unless such an appointment has been
made by the shareholders in general meeting (Art 2380 bis
(4)). The chairman is entrusted with the tasks of presiding
over general meetings and fixing the agenda of such
meetings.
By Article 2388(1), the board of directors (consiglio di
amministrazione) cannot deliberate validly unless a majority
of its members are present. The statutes may provide for
an enhanced majority. Provided that the statutes so
stipulate, or the general meeting so consents, the board of
directors may delegate powers to the one or more of its
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members (directtore general or comitato esecutivo), except in
relation to the preparation of the accounts, the issue of
bonds, the increase of a company’s capital, the reduction
of the company’s capital because of losses, and the
requirement of calling a general meeting because of the loss
of more than one third thereof (Arts 2381, 2423, 2420 ter,
2443, 2446 and 2447).
This limitation also exists in relation to the directors’
powers in relation to the preparation of a merger proposal
or one for a division (Arts 2501 ter and 2506 bis). The
board of directors determines the contents, limits and
modes of exercise of the delegated powers, and may always
issue instructions to the relevant organ (executive
committee or managing director); it is also empowered to
perform the delegated functions itself. Furthermore the
board is also empowered to evaluate the general
development of the business of the company on the basis
of reports from its subsidiary organs, i.e. the executive
committee or managing director (directore general). The
later individual is often the same person as the chairman.
According to Article 2384 of the Civil Code, the power
of representation granted to the directors by the statutes or
of the resolution appointing them is a general one.
Limitations of the powers of the directors contained in the
statutes or in a company resolution are not opposable to
third parties, even if they are published, unless it can be
shown that the third party has acted with the intention of
harming the company. The provisions of Article 2384
would seem to conform with the requirements of the First
Company Law Directive, and to be similar to those of
German law (see paras 31 and 164 of the German Civil
Code).
The remuneration of members of the board of directors
or the executive committee is determined by the statutes
or by the general meeting. It may take the form of a salary,
or a share in the profits. The remuneration of the directors
who are entrusted with specific tasks is determined by the
board of directors in consultation with the committee of
auditors (Art 2389). Particulars of the amount of
remuneration received by the directors and auditors must
appear in the notes to the accounts (nota integrativa), and be
given on a cumulative basis for each category (Art 2427, cl
16). Directors and auditors of listed companies must
declare annually to the National Commission for
Companies and the Stock Exchange (Commissione Nazionale
per la Società e la Borsa – CONSOB) the total amount of
remuneration of any kind whatsoever obtained from the
company or its subsidiaries (Law no 216 of 7 June 1974,
Art 17).
According to Article 2392 of the Civil Code, directors
must fulfil the duties imposed on them by law and the
statutes with the diligence required by reason of their office
and by their specific competence. They are jointly and
severally liable to the company for damage resulting from
their failure to respect this requirement, unless the relevant
tasks come within the competence of the executive
committee or one or more particular directors.
Furthermore, the directors are also jointly and severally
liable when they become aware of prejudicial acts and do
not do all within their power to prevent their performance
and eliminate or diminish their harmful consequences.
Nevertheless, a director who is himself without fault may
avoid liability for an improper transaction resolved on by
the board by recording his dissent in the minutes of the
meeting, and giving written notice to the chairman of the
committee of auditors. It follows from Article 2380(3) that
the same rules are applicable to the members of the
executive board and the board of directors (consiglio di
amministrazione) when the new dual board or monistic
system of management is used.
By Article 2390, a director may not participate in the
management of a business which competes with that of the
company, nor be a general partner in a competing firm,
unless he is authorised to by general meeting. Failure to
comply with these prohibitions may be sanctioned by
dismissal from office, and result in liability for damages.
The provisions of Article 2391 are designed to further
transparency and are applicable in the absence of any actual
conflict of interest. Article 2391(1) provides that should a
director be interested either on his own account, or on
behalf of a third party, in a particular company transaction,
he must disclose prescribed details of that interest to his
fellow directors and the committee of auditors. If he is
empowered to conclude the transaction, he must abstain
from doing so, and refer the matter to the board. The latter
body must give adequate reasons for approving the
transaction (Art 2391(2)). If the above provisions are not
complied with, and if the board or executive committee’s
decision is adopted by reason of the vote of the interested
director and is liable to cause harm to the company, the
directors or the committee or auditors may challenge the
decision within 90 days of its adoption. However directors
who voted for the latter decision cannot challenge it, but
absent or dissenting ones can. In all cases, the rights of
third parties acting in good faith on the basis of the
decision are protected (Art 2391(3)).
The directors are responsible for the damages suffered
by company as the result of their acts or omissions (Art
2391(4)). Furthermore, Article 2391(5) provides that
directors are liable to the company for damages suffered by
it by reason of the utilisation for their own advantage or for
that of third parties of facts, information or opportunities
about which they have become acquainted in the course of
their duties. The latter rule reminds one of the corporate
opportunity rule which is recognised under English and
American law.
An action for breach of the duties of the directors duties
may be brought by the company, even if it is in liquidation,
if the shareholders in general meeting so resolve, and the
resolution is passed by the favourable votes of the holders24
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of at least one-fifth of the company’s share capital (Art
2392(1) and (4)). The action must be brought within five
years of the termination of the relevant directors’ office
(Art 2393(3)). The passing of such a resolution means that
the relevant director is automatically dismissed. However,
the company may waive the brining of such an action or
compromise it if such procedure is not opposed by the
holders of at least one-fifth of the share capital. This
fraction is reduced to one-twentieth, or the lesser amount
permitted by the statutes, where the company has recourse
to the market for venture capital, ie it is a listed company,
or has more than 200 members (Art 2393(5)). Individual
shareholders holding at least one-fifth of the share capital,
(which amount may be increased up to one-third) may
bring a derivative action against the company. This fraction
is reduced to one twentieth or the lesser amount permitted
by the statutes, in the case of companies which have
recourse to the market for venture capital (Art 2393 bis (1)
and (2)). Creditors may bring an action against directors
who have not complied with the legal obligations
concerning the preservation of the company’s assets (Art
2394). A personal action may also be brought by members
who have suffered loss as the result of the fraud or
negligence of the directors (Art 2395).
Similar rules to those discussed above were made
applicable by Article 129 of Decree Law No 58 and 1998
to derivative actions against directors, managing directors,
and members of the committee of auditors of an Italian
companies quoted on a regulated market in Italy, or in
another EC state. Such an action might be brought by
persons who have been entered in the company’s register
of shareholders for at least six months, and who held at
least 5 per cent of the company’s capital, or such lesser
percentage as was prescribed by the statutes. The
requirement of minimum holding time has been abolished.
However, because of the absence of rules governing class
actions or permitting contingency fees, derivative actions
are unlikely to become common in Italy.
COMMITTEE OF AUDITORS
Position in unlisted companies
The rules governing the functions of the above entity
differ considerably according to whether or not the
company is a listed company, and as fully explained below,
whether the traditional rules governing management are
adopted, or whether the new dualistic or monistic system
described below is adopted, when the supervisory board or
the internal audit committee (comitato per il controllo sulla
gestione) is entrusted with certain functions similar to those
of the committee of auditors in traditional companies.
The rules governing the committee of auditors of
unlisted companies are principally contained in Articles
2397–2409 of the Civil Code, and have undergone a
number of revisions in recent years, culminating with the
enactment of the new provisions of the Civil Code in 2003.
The committee of auditors of an unlisted company
consists of between three and five persons, who may or
may not be members. In addition, two alternative auditors
must be appointed. At least one of the auditors and a
substitute must be entered on the register of auditors
maintained by the Ministry of Justice. The rest of them
must be entered on a prescribed professional register, or be
established university teachers (Art 2397). The auditors are
appointed for a period of three years by the general
meeting, and, in the case of the first auditors, by the deed
of incorporation (Art 2400). Article 2399 contains
elaborate rules according to which certain persons are
ineligible for appointment to the committee of auditors of
an unlisted company, or are required to vacate office, if so
appointed. Similar rules are made applicable to listed
companies under the provisions of Article 148(3) of
Decree Law No 58 and 1998. The removal of, or the
suspension of an auditor from the official register of
company auditors, results in his loss of membership of the
committee of auditors.
Although the committee of auditors has important
controlling functions, these do not extend to the audit of
the accounts except in the case of a company which does
not have recourse to the market for venture capital, and
which is not required to prepare consolidated accounts
(Art 2409 bis (3)). In the latter case, the committee will be
made up of auditors contained in a list approved by the
Ministry of Justice. The accounts of a company which has
recourse to the market for venture capital must be audited
by a properly qualified auditing firm supervised by
CONSOB, and regulated by certain special rules. Detailed
rules concerning the audit of the accounts of a company
adopting the traditional rules governing management and
control are contained in Articles 2409 bis to 2409 septies of
the Civil Code. In the case of companies employing the
new dualistic structure, the audit of the accounts is
governed by Articles 2409 quinquiesdecies and 2409
noviesdecies (2), which are in very similar terms, and which
make reference to the abovementioned provisions of the
Civil Code.
The committee of auditors of an unlisted company must
report to the general meeting on the balance sheet. The
position is similar in listed companies (see Civil Code,
Articles 2429 (2) and Decree Law No 58 of 1998, Art
153(1)).
The members of the committee of auditors must attend
board and general meetings, and meetings of the executive
committee of the board of directors (Art 2405(1)). They
are also required to satisfy themselves that the law and the
statutes and the principles of correct administration have
been observed and that the organisational, administrative
and accounting arrangements adopted by the company are
adequate, and on their practical functioning (Art 2403).
The auditors are empowered to carry out acts of
inspection and control at any time on an individual basis
(Art 2403 bis (1)). They may make use of their own 25
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employees for this purpose, unless such persons are
disqualified under Article 2399 of the Civil Code (Art 2403
bis (4)). They are required to carry on an investigation into
alleged wrongdoings without delay if asked to do so by the
holders of one-twentieth of the company’s share capital
(Art 2408(2)). A similar rule is contained in Article 128(1)
of Decree Law No 58 of 1998, which is applicable to listed
companies. The required fraction of the company’s share
capital is reduced to one-fiftieth in the case of companies
which have recourse to the market for venture capital; this
rule is also applicable to listed companies.
According to Article 2409(1), the holders of one-tenth
of the company’s capital (one-fiftieth in the case of
companies having recourse to the market for venture
capital) may make a report to the competent tribunal if
there is justified suspicion of grave irregularities in the
fulfilment of the duties of the directors or the auditors
which cause damage to the company or to one or more
companies controlled by it. The tribunal may order an
investigation into the management of the company at the
cost of its shareholders (Art 2409(2)). It will not act in this
way, and will adjourn the proceedings for a specific period
if the general meeting replaces the directors and auditors
with persons of adequate professional competence, who
must determine without delay whether irregularities have
taken place, and should they find that they have, make
reference to the tribunal on the results of the investigation,
and on the actions taken (Art 2409(3)). Should such
procedures prove insufficient to eliminate the
irregularities, the tribunal may order provisional measures
and call a general meeting for the purpose of passing the
necessary resolutions. In the most serious cases, it may
remove the company’s directors and auditors from office
and order the appointment of a judicial administrator, who
will be charged with the temporary management of the
business (Art 2409(4)).
According to Article 2409(5), action may be taken
under Article 2409 by the supervisory board or internal
audit committee as well as by the committee of auditors.
Where the company has recourse to the market for venture
capital, it may also be taken to the Public Prosecutor.
The position in listed companies
It seems appropriate to deal with this matter here,
although the role of the committee of auditors of such
companies will be of less significance when they do not
adopt the traditional system of management. Many of the
rules governing the committee of auditors of a listed
company are contained in Articles 148-154 of Decree Law
No 58 of 24 February 1998. Certain of the rules contained
in the Civil Code are disapplied as far as auditors of listed
companies, ie Italian companies which are listed on an
Italian regulated market or on one in another member
state of the EC are concerned. The provisions which are
disapplied by Article 154 of Decree Law No 58 and 1998
are Articles 2397–2399, 2403, 2403 bis, 2405(1), 2426
sentences 5 and 6, 2429(2), 2435 bis 2440 and 2441(6). It
follows that the rules governing the appointment of
members of the committee of auditors contained in Article
2401; those governing their remuneration contained in
Article 2402; those governing meetings and resolutions
contained in Article 2404; those concerning the giving of
notice of general meetings by auditors if directors fail to do
so contained in Article 2406; those governing the liabilities
of auditors contained in Article 2407; and those governing
reports to the committee of auditors and the court
contained in Articles 2408 and 2409 are applicable to the
committee of auditors of listed companies.
According to Article 148(1) or Decree Law No 58 of
1998 the statutes of listed companies must state the
number of regular members of the committee of auditors,
which must not be less than three, and the number of
alternate members, which must not be less than two. They
must also state the method of, and requirements for,
nomination as chairman of the committee, and the
limitations on the number of offices which may be held by
the members thereof. Article 148(2) provides that the
statutes must contain provisions ensuring that the minority
shareholders must elect at least one member of the
committee. If this has more than three members, the
required number is instead two. Detailed provisions
concerning ineligibility for appointment as auditors of
listed companies are contained in Article 148(3), which
also applies to persons who are disqualified from holding
office as a director under Article 2382 of the Civil Code. It
applies to spouses, parents, parents-in-law of, and persons
within the fourth degree of relationship to directors on the
company; or any company which controls it or any
subsidiaries; as well as to senior and other employees of the
company or any company which controls it, or any
subsidiaries. The professional qualifications and conduct of
members of the committee or auditors has been the
subject of decrees made by the Ministry of Justice.
The duties of the committee of auditors of a listed
company are set out in Article 149(1) of Decree Law No
58 of 1998. It is thus required to examine whether the law
and statutes of the company are observed, and whether the
principles of correct administration are adhered to. It must
also examine the adequacy of the organisation of the
company, particularly from the viewpoint of the allocation
of competences, the system of internal control and that of
management accounting, as well as the suitability of that
accounting system for the purpose of representing
management transactions. The committee of auditors is
also required to examine the adequacy of the provisions
made by a controlling company for the purpose of ensuring
that a subsidiary has given the notices to it which are
required by law.
Article 149(2) of the Decree Law of 1998 requires the
members of the committee of auditors to assist at general
meetings and meetings of the board of directors and of the
executive board. By Article 149(3) the committee of26
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auditors is required to communicate to CONSOB without
delay any irregularity it finds in exercising its supervisory
tasks, and to send it the relevant minutes of the particular
meeting and of the investigations undertaken, together
with any other useful documentation. Paragraph 3 does not
apply to Italian companies which are only listed on a
regulated market in another EC state.
The directors are required by Article 150(1) of Decree
Law No 58 to report to the committee of auditors in good
time, and in accordance with the requirements of the deed
of incorporation, and at least on a three monthly basis on
activities which have been carried out, and on operations
of major economic, financial or patrimonial importance
affected by the company, or by a company controlled by it,
and in particular on operations which involve a potential
conflict of interests.
Article 151 of Decree Law No 58 of 1998 sets out the
powers of the committee of auditors. Paragraph 1 of this
provision provides that the auditors have the power, acting
individually or otherwise, to ask the directors to notify
them of the progress of company operations or of a
determinate matter, as well as to proceed at any time to
measures of inspection and control. By Article 151(2) the
committee of auditors may, on giving notice to the
chairman of the company, call a general meeting, a meeting
of the board of directors or of the executive board, and
may call on employees of the company to assist them in
performing their tasks. Similar powers may be exercised by
two members of the committee.
According to Article 151(3) the committee of auditors
may, for the purpose of determining the adequacy of and
appropriateness of the system of management accounting
make use of its own employees at its own responsibility on
an individual or other basis, and at its own expense
provided that such employees are not disqualified from
acting under Article 148(3) of Decree Law No 58 of 1998.
Furthermore, Article 151(4) provides that the auditors are
responsible for recording the investigations made by them
in the register of deliberations and meetings of the
committee kept at the company’s head office.
According to Article 152(1) and (2) of Decree Law No
58 of 1998, if they have justified suspicion of grave
irregularities in the fulfilment of the duties of the directors,
the committee of auditors or CONSOB may report the
matter to the competent tribunal under Article 2409 of the
Civil Code. The costs of the investigation must be borne by
the company. The court is empowered to dismiss
individual directors when the committee of auditors has
reported to it. CONSOB may, according to Article 152(3),
not make a report to the court where the relevant Italian
company’s shares are listed only on a regulated market in
another EC state.
It may be noted that Article 152 of the Decree Law No
58 at 1998 contains somewhat similar but less detailed
provisions to those of Article 2409 of the Civil Code.
Finally, Article 153(1) of Decree Law No 58 of 1998
provides that the committee of auditors reports to the
general meeting convened for the purpose of approving the
accounts on the supervisory activities it has undertaken,
and the blameworthy acts revealed. In addition, Article
153(2) provides that the committee may make proposals
to the general meeting concerning the accounts and their
approval as well as on other matters within its competence.
III THE DUAL BOARD SYSTEM
Under the above system, the supervisory board has
some of the powers which, under the traditional system,
are entrusted to the general meeting, for example the
appointment and dismissal of the members of the
executive board (which corresponds to the board of
directors) and many of those which are entrusted to the
committee of auditors when the traditional system, which
has been described above, is used. These include the
supervisory tasks which are given to the latter committee
under Article 2403 when the latter system is used. It is
given other powers which would belong to the committee
of auditors under the traditional system of management
and control by Article 2409 quaterdecies.
The powers of the supervisory board are set out
principally in Article 2409 terdecies of the civil Code. Under
the dual board system, the board is responsible (as in
Germany) for the approval of the accounts (Article 2409
terdecies (b)). As already indicated under all three systems of
management, the accounts also have to be approved by
external auditors. The only exception to this rule applies to
public companies which do not have recourse to the
market for venture capital, and which do not have to
produce a consolidated balance sheet. As already indicated
the statutes of such companies may entrust the committee
of auditors with auditing functions, provided that they are
suitably qualified. Article 2409 terdecies (d) empowers the
supervisory board to bring actions against member of the
executive board who have been responsible for breaches of
their duties. The supervisory board is empowered by
Article 2409 terdecies (e) to make a report to the competent
court in accordance with Article 2409, which has been
discussed above. Finally, by Article 2409 terdecies (f), the
supervisory board is required to report at least once a year
to the general meeting on the performance of its
supervisory tasks, and on blameworthy matters discovered
by it.
The members of the supervisory board are required to
perform their tasks with the degree of diligence required
by reason of their office. They are jointly and severally
liable together with the members of the executive board
for the latter’s acts or omissions which result in damage
which would not have occurred had they exercised the
degree of supervision appropriate to their office.
The supervisory board must consist of at least three
members. The original members must, according to Article 27
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2409 duodecies (2) and (3) be appointed in the deed of
incorporation, whilst later appointments, which are for a
maximum period of three years, are made by the general
meeting. According to Article 2409 novies, the members of
the first executive board are appointed by the deed of
incorporation: subsequent appointments are made by the
supervisory board. The maximum period for
appointments is three years. The task of the executive
board is to carry out the tasks necessary for the purpose of
attaining the company’s objects. It must consist of at least
two members, who need not be shareholders. Article 2409
novies (4) makes it clear that members of the executive
board may not be appointed to the supervisory board. A
number of rules which are applicable to the board of
directors of a traditional company are made applicable to
the executive board by Article 2409 undecies.
IV THE UNITARY BOARD SYSTEM
This model involves a board of directors (consiglio di
amministrazione) which is responsible for management of
the company and a committee of such a board (comitato per
il controllo sulla gestione) the internal audit committee which
is appointed by the directors unless the statutes provide
otherwise (Arts 2409 septiesdecies and octiesdecies). The
members of this committee do not participate in the
management of the company. One third of the members of
the board must fulfil the requirements of independence
imposed on members of the committee of auditors. If the
statutes so provide, such persons may also be required to
conform with the codes of conduct of professional bodies,
or with those applicable to management companies of
regulated markets.
Unless the statutes provide otherwise, the members of
the internal audit committee are appointed by the board of
directors. In the case of companies which have recourse to
the market for venture capital, the requisite number of
members is three. The members of the committee must
comply with the requirements of integrity and
professionalism stipulated in the statutes and with those of
independence stipulated for members of the committee of
auditors in Article 2399. They must not exercise
management functions in the company itself or one which
controls it, or in one which it controls (Art 2409 octiesdecies
(2)). At least one member of the internal audit committee
must be entered on the register of auditors (revisori
contabili).
The functions of the committee are set out in Article
2409 octiedecies(5). It examines the adequacy of the
organisational structure of the company, and its system of
internal control, administration and accounting,
particularly whether this system is suitable for the purpose
of correctly representing the management of the business.
Furthermore it examines the performance of other duties
entrusted to the directors, and in particular their
relationship with those responsible for the audit of the
account. Certain of the rules made applicable to the
committee of auditors under the traditional system, ie
those in Articles 2404(1), (3) and (4), 2405(1), 2408 and
2409 are also made applicable to the internal audit
committee. The provisions of Article 2404 relate to
meetings and resolutions; and those of 2405(1) to
participation in the meetings of the board of direcrors and
the general meeting. Article 2408 relats to reporting
blameworthy facts to the committee of auditors, whilst
Article 2409 relates to invoking the jurisdiction of the
court.
Most of the provisions relating to the board of directors
of a company adopting the traditional rules relating to
management and control are made applicable to the board
of a company set adopting the new monistic system by
Article 2409 noviesdecies(1). The audit of the accounts of
such companies is regulated by the rules set out in Article
2409 noviesdecies(2).
V CONCLUDING REMARKS
The above provisions of Italian law are very detailed, and
perhaps made a little difficult to understand because of the
fact that although the reform of January 22, 2003 was far
reaching, it did not attempt to consolidate all the relevant
provisions of Italian company law. It remains to be seen
what use will be made in practice of the two new models,
which are likely to serve rather different needs. It may be
that the dualistic model will remain fairly uncommon as it
still apparently is in France. However, the powers of the
supervisory board to bring an action against defaulting
directors may have some tendency to render the latter
model attractive to some (note in this sense D Santosuosso,
Il nuovo diritto societario, pub D&G 2003, p 72). One may
question whether the separation of functions between the
members of the board of directors who are concerned with
management and the internal audit committee of that
board under the new monistic system will always work
effectively in practice.
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